The US Lock of the Web

- This piece argues that the web's security and identity infrastructure (TLS/SSL certificates, DNSSEC, RPKI, WHOIS) is vulnerable to pressure from the U.S. government because key bodies—ICANN, IANA, and the major certificate authorities—fall under U.S. jurisdiction. - ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) oversees domain names and IP addresses; though it was nominally globalized in 2016, it remains a California nonprofit subject to U.S. law. - The five "root" TLS certificate authorities (CAs) trusted by default in browsers are all U.S.-based and could be compelled to issue or revoke certificates, effectively allowing surveillance or censorship. - RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure), which secures internet routing, is similarly controlled via U.S.-based Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and the IANA functions contract held by ICANN. - While other nations (EU, China, Russia) are building alternatives (e.g., national DNS roots, local CAs), the current system still funnels authority through U.S. legal and technical gatekeepers, creating a single point of geopolitical pressure.