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Side-Channel Protections in Hardware Implementations of PQC ML-KEM Verification

This paper analyzes side-channel vulnerabilities in hardware implementations of ML-KEM verification, a key component of post-quantum cryptography, and proposes protections to mitigate these security risks.

Background

- Side-channel attacks are a class of security exploit where an attacker observes physical characteristics of a device (power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, timing, etc.) to infer secret data like cryptographic keys, rather than breaking the math of the algorithm directly. - ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism, standardized as FIPS 203) is the primary post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithm selected by NIST to replace current public-key cryptography (RSA, ECC) against future quantum computers. "Post-quantum" means it's designed to resist attacks from both classical and quantum computers. - "Verification" refers to the step where a receiver checks that a ciphertext was honestly created, not maliciously crafted to leak key material — a critical but often rushed step in hardware implementations. - This paper is practically relevant because ML-KEM is being deployed now (e.g., in TLS 1.3, Signal, Apple iMessage, Google Chrome) and any vulnerability in its hardware implementation could compromise post-quantum security promises before they fully take effect.